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Default options have an enormous impact on household "choices." Defaults matter because opting
out of a default is costly and these costs change over time, generating an option value of waiting.
In addition, people have a tendency to procrastinate. We develop a theory of optimal defaults based
on these considerations. We find that it is sometimes optimal to set extreme defaults, which are far
away from the mean optimal savings rate. A default that is far away from a consumer's optimal
savings rate may make that consumer better off since such a "bad" default will lead procrastinating
consumers to more quickly opt out of the default. We calibrate our model and use it to calculate
optimal defaults for employees at four different companies. Our work suggests that optimal defaults
are likely to be at one of three savings rates: the minimum savings rate (i.e., 0%), the match
threshold (typically 5% or 6%), or the maximal savings rate.
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bmadrian@wharton.upenn.edu andrew.metrick@wharton.upenn.eduDefault options have an enormous impact on household “choices.” Such eﬀects
have now been extensively documented in the literature on 401(k) plans.1 Defaults
have been shown to aﬀect participation, savings rates, rollovers, and asset allocation.
F o re x a m p l e ,C h o ie ta l . ( 2 0 0 3 b )s t u d yt h r e eﬁrms that use automatic enrollment.
When employees at these ﬁrms are automatically enrolled in their 401(k) plan, only a
tiny fraction opt out, producing participation rates exceeding 85% regardless of tenure.
But when employees at these ﬁrms were not automatically enrolled, participation rates
were signiﬁcantly lower, ranging from 26% — 43% after six months of tenure, and from
57% — 69% after three years of tenure.
Defaults matter for three key reasons that we model in this paper. First, acts of
commission – e.g., opting out of a default – are costly. Second, these costs change
randomly over time and therefore generate an option value of waiting to change a
default. Decision makers would like to wait for a low cost period (e.g., a free weekend)
to make a change. Third, people have a tendency to procrastinate. Even if they want
to make a change, they have a tendency to delay that change longer than they should.
Because of these eﬀects, the choice of a particular default can have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on consumer welfare. However, it is not always obvious how to select a socially
optimal default.
If all employees would like to be saving at a rate of exactly 5% in their 401(k) plan,
then the employees’ welfare will be maximized if the employer sets a 5% default. But
1Madrian and Shea (2001), Choi et al (2002a, 2003b).
3the calculation of an optimal default is not as straightforward if diﬀerent employees
have diﬀerent optimal savings rates. For example, what is the optimal default savings
rate if employees have optimal savings rates that are distributed uniformly with a mean
of 5%?
In this paper, we develop a theory of optimal defaults which implies that the obvious
answer to the previous question – 5% – is not necessarily the right answer. In a world
of heterogeneous agents, it may sometimes be optimal to set extreme defaults which
are far away from the mean optimal savings rate. This eﬀect arises for two reasons.
First, a default that is far away from a consumer’s optimal savings rate may make
that consumer better oﬀ than a default that is closer to the consumer’s optimal savings
rate. Intuitively, if an agent suﬀers from a procrastination problem, then a “bad”
default – i.e., one that is far from the consumer’s optimal savings rate – will be more
motivating than a better default. Hence, sometimes bad defaults make people better
oﬀ than better but imperfect defaults. Second, our theory implies that optimal defaults
are highly sensitive to the actual distribution of optimal savings rates. In particular,
optimal defaults are often associated with the modal optimal savings rate and not the
mean optimal savings rate. Since these modes are sometimes extreme (e.g., minimum
or maximum contribution rates), optimal defaults will sometimes be extreme as well.
At the end of our paper we calibrate our model and use it to calculate optimal de-
faults for employees at four diﬀerent companies. For two of our companies, the optimal
default is close to the mean optimal savings rate, whereas for the other two companies
4the optimal defaults are extreme: 0% and 15% respectively. Our work suggests that
optimal defaults are likely to be at one of three savings rates: the minimum savings
rate (0%), the employer match threshold (typically 5% or 6%), or the maximal savings
rate (around 15% in our sample of companies from the late 1990’s).2
1. A model of savings choices
We adapt the model of Choi et al. (2002b) to describe the 401(k) enrollment decisions of
employees that have been newly hired at a ﬁrm. However, the model is general enough
to describe any problem in which an actor decides when to move from a default state
sD to an optimal state s∗.
We assume that each employee at a ﬁrm has a ﬁxed optimal savings rate (i.e.,
optimal state) s∗,w i t hd e n s i t yf u n c t i o nf characterizing the distribution of these op-
timal savings rates for the population of employees in the ﬁrm. When new employees
join the ﬁrm, the employees are automatically enrolled at a default savings rate of sD,
which is a choice variable for the ﬁrm. In this paper, we consider the case in which
this default can only take values in the support of f.3 We assume that the ﬁrm uses
a single default savings rate for all of its employees either because the ﬁrm does not
observe an employee’s true type, s∗, or because of legal/practical costs of implementing
employee-speciﬁcd e f a u l t s . 4
2More recently, regulatory changes under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
of 2001 (EGTRRA) have led many companies to raise their maximum savings rates well above the
historical norm of 15%.
3See Choi et al. (2002b) for a generalization.
4Such employee-speciﬁc defaults are a natural extension of our current framework and merit the-
oretical and practical evaluation.
5Employees remain at the default election sD unless they opt out of the default by
incurring a cost c. This opt-out cost is drawn each period and takes the value 1 with
probability µ<1 and value 0 with probability 1 − µ.T h ev a l u eo ft h ec o s ti sk n o w n
when the agent decides on her action. We suppress individual and time subscripts to
simplify notation.
When the agent opts out, she sets her savings rate equal to her optimal savings rate
s∗, which we assume the agent knows with certainty.5 Until that action takes place,
the agent suﬀers a ﬂow loss of L = L(sD,s ∗) ≥ 0, where the ﬁrst argument of L is the
current savings rate and the second argument of L is the optimal savings rate. After
the action occurs, the agent suﬀers a ﬂow loss of 0 = L(s∗,s ∗).
Finally, we assume that agents are naive hyperbolic discounters, with discount
function 1,β δ ,β δ 2,....6 Such naive agents believe that their future selves will make
choices that are consistent with their current preferences. We adopt such naive beliefs
because they increase the force of procrastination, but our qualitative results would
be unchanged if we instead assumed that agents are sophisticated in their beliefs. For
simplicity and analytical tractability, we set δ = 1 (no long-run discounting).7 We also
5Another natural generalization is to consider the case in which agents have imperfect information
about their personal value of s∗. If agents learn more about this value over time, they have another
motive for delaying the costly action of opting out of the default.
6See Laibson (1997) for a discussion of hyperbolic discount functions and Akerlof (1992) and
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) for a discussion of naifs and procrastination. Note that the term
“hyperbolic” is overly restrictive, since the important property of these preferences is simply that
they are characterized by more discounting in the short-run than in the long-run.
7We will calibrate our model at the frequency of a pay-cycle. So if the annual long-run discount
rate is 0.05, then the discount rate per pay-cycle is approximately 0.05/26 = 0.002 or 0.05/12 =
0.004, implying respective δ values of 0.998 and 0.996. Relative to these values, setting δ =1h a s
little impact on our results.
6adopt the standard hyperbolic assumption of β<1.
We use the following timing convention. If the employee has not previously opted
out of the default, the period begins with a ﬂow loss of L. The employee then draws a
current opt-out cost c and decides whether to delay opting out or to instead pay the
cost, thereby ending the game. If the employee delays she will pay a ﬂow cost of L next
period and also face an anticipated continuation value function, which we denote v(c0),
where c0 represents next period’s draw from the cost distribution. Hence, the employee
chooses to pay c and end the game if the cost today is less than the discounted cost
of delay, or c<β [L + Ev(c0)]. When this inequality is not satisﬁed, the employee
chooses to delay. Ignoring mixed strategies, which only arise on a zero measure region
of the parameter space, the employee’s strategy is thus
“Opt out only when c =0 ” i fβ [L + Ev(c0)] < 1
“Opt out when c =0o rc =1 ” i fβ [L + Ev(c0)] ≥ 1
(1)
1.1. Naive expectations and the continuation value function v(c). Since the
employee is assumed to be a naive hyperbolic agent, the continuation value function
is constructed under the (mistaken) belief that all future selves will exhibit no time
discounting, since this is what today’s self wants those future selves to do. Recall that
δ =1 .
The strategy of opting out whatever the draw from the cost distribution means that
the employee’s expected loss is µ = E(c). Waiting until c = 0 to opt out implies that
7the employee’s expected loss would be




This formula has a natural interpretation: the expected costs are equal to the expected
per-period loss, µL, multiplied by the expected duration of the losses, 1
1−µ.
If L<1−µ,t h e n
µL
1−µ <µ , implying that the expected losses generated by waiting
to opt out until c = 0 are less than the losses from opting out immediately at cost
c =1 . S oi fL<1 − µ, the employee will plan to wait until c =0t oo p to u t . I f




   
   
µL
1−µ if L<1 − µ
µ if L ≥ 1 − µ
(2)
We reiterate that Ev(c) is based on naive beliefs, so this expectation reﬂects the actor’s
incorrect model of her future behavior.
1.2. Actual actions and welfare. Using (1) and (2), the probability of opting
out in any period will be
p =

   
   
1 − µ if L<1
β − µ
1i f 1
β − µ ≤ L
8So the expected cost of opting out, conditional on opting out, will be
E(c|opt out) =

   




β − µ ≤ L
Let w(c) represent the employee’s expected total costs, discounted with the agent’s
long-run discount factor. A recursive representation for w(c)i sg i v e nb y
Ew(c)=pE(c|opt out) + (1 − p)δ[L + Ew(c
0)]
= pE(c|opt out) + (1 − p)[L + Ew(c
0)].
We evaluate social welfare using the long-run discount factor δ and omitting the short-
run discount factor β. These preferences represent the actor’s preferences at economic
birth, which we assume occurs before she starts working at the ﬁrm. The last equation
contains no discounting, since it reﬂects the fact that δ = 1 in our calibration. Note
however that our results would not change qualitatively if we had instead assumed
δ<1 throughout our analysis.
Because Ew(c)=Ew(c0), we can show that
Ew(c)=

   
   
µL
1−µ if L< 1
β − µ
µ if 1
β − µ ≤ L
We are now in a position to characterize the relationship between defaults and
9welfare. To do this, we consider the relationship between expected (dis)utility and L,
the per-period ﬂow losses of not being at an optimum. To focus on the role of L, we
stop suppressing L in our notation and consider
W(L)=Ew(c)|L.
W(L) is the expected losses for an agent with initial ﬂow losses per period of L.
In a standard model with exponential discounting (i.e., β =1 ) ,W(L) would increase
as ﬂow costs L increase. But for hyperbolics (i.e., β<1), it will always be the case
that W is non-monotonic in L. To see this, note that W(L)=µ when L =1−µ. This
is the level of L at which an exponential (i.e., dynamically consistent) agent should opt
out of the default whatever the cost realization. But when c = 1, a hyperbolic agent
will only opt out of the default if L ≥ 1
β −µ, which is greater than 1−µ. Hence, when
1 − µ<L< 1
β − µ,t h eh y p e r b o l i ca g e n ti si n s u ﬃciently motivated to act, and this
motivational gap produces self-defeating procrastination. In this region of L values,
the expected loss function lies above µ,t h ev a l u et h a tW(L) would take if the agent
were not procrastinating and were willing to act at the high cost realization. But once
L is high enough – speciﬁcally, above 1
β −µ – the procrastination eﬀect vanishes and
expected costs fall back to µ, since the hyperbolic agent is now willing to act whatever
the cost realization. Figure 1 plots the expected cost function against the ﬂow costs
L, revealing the non-monotonicity that arises whenever β<1.
In a world with procrastination, moving the agent further from the optimum (i.e.,
10increasing ﬂow costs L) can make an agent better oﬀ, since it decreases the agent’s
tendency to procrastinate. This eﬀect is not everywhere oﬀset by the direct eﬀect of
reduced welfare arising from the increase in the delay cost, L.
1.3. The ﬁrm’s optimization problem. We now analyze the employer’s choice
of a default savings rate under the assumption that the employer is interested in max-
imizing the welfare of the ﬁrm’s employees. We recognize, however, that employer and
employee incentives need not generally be aligned. This is particularly likely in the case
presented here, since naive hyperbolic agents will not anticipate their own tendency
to procrastinate and hence will not pick an employer based on the employer’s ability
to mitigate the harms of such procrastination. Therefore, this normative exercise is
also relevant for regulators or unions that can inﬂuence the defaults that ﬁrms pick.
Identifying and incorporating the other motivations and constraints that ﬁrms face in
designing their beneﬁt plans (e.g. non-discrimination testing, good corporate citizen-
ship, reputational value in the labor market, or personal altruism, to name a few) is
beyond the scope of the current paper.
We derive the optimal default, s∗












This quadratic cost function is convex in deviations from the optimal savings rate,
s∗, and has the advantage of analytic tractability. However, it does not reﬂect the
particular institutional features of many 401(k) plans (e.g., an employer match that
ends at a threshold, implying a discontinuity in the cost function). We believe that
the quadratic cost function represents a good compromise between tractability and
realism.
We will minimize equation (3) numerically, using the actual estimated distribution
of optimal savings rates. However, for the purposes of exposition, it is useful to consider
t h ec a s ei nw h i c hf(s∗)i su n i f o r mo v e rs u p p o r t[ s,s]. In this case, one can prove the





   
   
¯ s+s




κ (1 − µ)o rs −
q
1
κ (1 − µ)i f s − s large
Intuitively, when there is little variation in optimal savings rates, it is best to design a
default that is in the middle of the range of optimal savings rates, since all employees
will then be very close to their optimal savings rate and delays in opting out of the
default will not be very costly. By contrast, when there is a great deal of variation
in optimal savings rates, it is better to design a default that is close to one of the
12two boundaries of the support. This “boundary” strategy reduces the proportion of
employees who engage in costly procrastination, since the boundary strategy reduces
the fraction of employees who fall in the “procrastination” interval 1 − µ<L<
(1/β) − µ.
Finally, note that if β =1a n df is uniform, then s∗
D =
¯ s+s
2 will always be an
optimum8 because the procrastination eﬀect does not apply and there is no gain in
welfare from moving agents away from their optima.
It is also useful to emphasize a trivial property of these models, which is important
in the empirical analysis that follows. This additional eﬀect is easiest to understand if
we assume that f is a discrete density on the domain of feasible savings rates: {0.00,







In other words, as the cost of deviations rises (κ →∞ ), the optimal default converges
to the mode of the distribution of s∗.T h i s e ﬀect is driven by the fact that for large
costs of deviating from s∗, all employees will immediately adjust to their s∗ except
those who are already at their optima. Hence, the optimal social policy minimizes
adjustment costs by setting the default equal to the most common value of s∗.W e
r e f e rt ot h i sa st h em o d ee ﬀect.
8However, it will not generally be the unique optimum.
131.4. Calibration. Our model has very few free parameters: the density of optimal
savings rates, f(s∗); the short-term discount factor β; the scaling variable κ;a n dt h e
probability of a high-cost draw µ. We further restrict this list by using individual
employee data to pin down the density f (see next section). We set β = 2
3, reﬂecting a
large body of experimental evidence and a growing body of ﬁeld evidence. For example,
Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2003) use the method of simulated moments to
estimate β using household ﬁnancial data. Their benchmark estimate is 0.70 with a
standard error of 0.11.
Only κ and µ remain to be calibrated. Before doing this we need to pick units for
the variables in our model. We assume that time units are periods of a pay cycle (about
two weeks). We assume that utility units can be interpreted in terms of a money metric
in which one unit of utility is equal in value to 1/10 of a pay cycle of income. So when
the cost realization is high (c = 1), opting out of the default generates a time cost that
is equal in value to 1/10 of the agent’s income during that pay cycle. We assume that
such busyness is the norm and set µ =0 .9. It then follows that the cost realization will
be zero 1/10 (1 − µ)o ft h et i m e .
To set κ, we use the following thought experiment. Suppose that a consumer is
ten percentage points away from her optimal savings rate: |sD − s∗| =0 .1. What is
the money-metric cost of this deviation? Let x represent the loss in units of 1/10th
of one pay cycle of income. Then, κ(0.1)2 = x. We will consider a range of values
for x :0 . 1 ,1 ,1 0 . T h i st r a n s l a t e si n t ot he following range of values for κ : 10, 100,
141000. We consider this wide range for two reasons. First, we are agnostic about the
appropriate calibration value. Second, we wish to explore the sensitivity of our results
to the choice of κ. However, if forced to choose, we would set κ =1 0 0 , implying that
a ten percentage point deviation in one’s savings rate is as bad as losing one tenth of
one’s income during that pay cycle. For companies with an employer match, one could
motivate losses of this magnitude by considering the missed match payments induced
by undersaving.
2. Empirical analysis
Table 1 shows the variation in both 401(k) plan design and employee characteristics of
the four companies for which we compute the optimal default 401(k) savings rate. We
denote these four companies by their industry: Health, Oﬃc e ,F o o d ,a n dF i n a n c e .A l l
are large employers with well-established 401(k) plans.
There are two key diﬀerences in the 401(k) plan environment that vary across the
companies. First, two of the companies (Health and Oﬃce) match employee contri-
butions up to 6% of pay, while the other two have no match at all. These latter
companies are of interest because the distribution of employee contribution rates will
not be aﬀected by the presence of a match threshold. Having an employer match may
either raise or lower the desired 401(k) contribution rate. Because the match subsidizes
saving in the 401(k) plan, employees with a match may desire to contribute more, at
least up to the match threshold. However, the match also increases the total amount
of savings that is being done, and the employees may use the match as a means to
15oﬀset their own contributions.
The second key diﬀerence in plan environment is that two of the companies (Oﬃce
a n dF o o d )h a v ea ne m p l o y e r - s p o n s o r e dd e ﬁned beneﬁt pension plan, while the other
two do not. Other things equal, we would expect a lower desired savings rate for
employees in companies with a deﬁned beneﬁtp e n s i o n .
The workforce demographics of our four companies also vary quite considerably.
The median pay ranges from $25,000 per year in Food to $41,000 per year in Finance.
Because Social Security replaces a higher fraction of income for low income employees,
we would expect a higher desired savings rate for high income employees. There is also
signiﬁcant variation in the fraction of employees that are female (from 30% in Oﬃce
to 78% in Health) and the median age of the workforce (from 29 years in Finance to
39 years at Food).
To estimate the distribution of optimal savings rates (i.e., the density f in the
model), we use two approaches. First, we report densities over 401(k) savings rates for
“medium-tenure” employees. We informally reason that such medium-tenure employees
have been at a ﬁrm long enough to select their optimal savings rate (i.e., the option
value of waiting and procrastination hurdles have been surmounted), but not so long
that tenure-driven selection eﬀects dominate the data. These savings densities are
reported in Table 2 for employees with 3-5 years of tenure (density f1)a n d5 - 7y e a r s
of tenure (density f2).
Second, we use a regression framework to control for demographic variables. We
16run an ordered logit regression in which the explanatory variable is the actual 401(k)
contribution rate chosen by each individual employee. We include non-participation,
which implies a 0% contribution rate, as one of the categories. The control variables in
the regressions are ln(pay), ln(age), ln(tenure), and a gender dummy variable (D =1
if the employee is female). We then predict the distribution of contribution rates
that would obtain if each employee had 30 years of tenure, holding other demographic
characteristics constant. The underlying presumption behind this exercise is that 30
years is enough time to overcome any delays due to procrastination or the option value
of waiting. The projected density from this procedure is reported as density f3 in Table
2.
With these densities in hand, we are now in a position to estimate the optimal
savings rate by minimizing equation (3), the social welfare function. We undertake
this maximization for 3 × 3 × 4 cases of interest: three diﬀerent values for κ, three
diﬀerent ways of calculating the density f, and four diﬀerent test companies. The
results of these maximizations are reported in Table 3.
Table 3 documents six ﬁndings. First, the analysis reveals a high degree of het-
erogeneity in policy recommendations. The optimal default ranges from 0% to 15%.
Moreover, even within a single ﬁrm there exists a large degree of variation in optimal
defaults (e.g., Finance). Second, the range of variation in optimal defaults is twice
as large as the range of average optimal savings rates. Third, the optimal default
calculation is extremely sensitive to distributional assumptions on s∗.T os e et h i s ,ﬁx
17κ = 100 and read across the columns. The defaults show substantial variation arising
from very small (within-company) diﬀerences in f1,f 2, and f3 (see Table 2). Fourth,
as κ gets large, much of the variation in optimal defaults is driven by the mode eﬀect.
For κ = 1000, ﬁve out of twelve of the optimal defaults are equal to the modal optimal
savings rate. Fifth, the optimal defaults vary in a sensible way with the underlying
ﬁrm-speciﬁc attributes. Firms whose employees have a high motive to save turn out
to have higher optimal defaults than ﬁrms whose employees have a low motive to save.
For example, the employees at Food have a deﬁned beneﬁt plan and a low average
salary (i.e., a high average Social Security income replacement rate), and hence very
low optimal defaults (0% to 3%). By contrast, the employees at Finance have no de-
ﬁned beneﬁt plan, a high average salary, and a median optimal default of 14%. Sixth,
and ﬁnally, the optimal defaults tend to cluster in one of three regions: close to 0%,
close to the match threshold (6% for Health and Oﬃce), or close to the maximum
contribution rate allowed under the plan.
3. Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has presented a model of 401(k) enrollment. The model includes four
components: costs of opting out of a default, an option value of waiting to incur those
costs, procrastination in opting out of a default, and heterogeneity in optimal savings
rates.
One should also consider other important psychological and economic issues when
picking socially optimal defaults. First, some employees may interpret defaults as im-
18plicit advice, an issue that does not arise in the current model since each employee
is assumed to know her true optimal savings rate.9 Second, defaults may be partic-
ularly sticky because of loss aversion.10 If the default is perceived to be a reference
point, then deviations from that reference point may be psychologically aversive, since
the resulting “gains” from the deviation (e.g., higher current consumption) are only
weighted half as much as the resulting “losses” (e.g., lower saving). Third, if house-
holds do not know how to think about the future or are overoptimistic about future
income, they may undervalue savings. In such a world, it may be optimal to pick a
high default savings rate, even if households eventually move away from it. Fourth,
households may know the optimal savings rate but not appreciate how important it is
to implement it, increasing action delays. Fifth, choosing a long-run savings rate that is
one percentage point too low is more costly than choosing a long-run savings rate that
is one percentage point too high (since retirement is short relative to working life and
the utility function generates a precautionary savings motive11), suggesting a desirable
upward shading of optimal defaults. Sixth, optimal savings rates are not constant over
time (as we assume), but instead are likely to trend up slowly with working age. Sev-
enth, the ﬁrm may wish to pick an optimal default that weights some employees more
heavily than others. For example, it may be sensible to calculate optimal defaults that
overweight the interests of employees that are likely to have a long duration of em-
9Employees may treat a zero default as weaker implicit advice than a non-zero default.
10See Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Thaler (1980), and Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) for a
discussion of loss aversion and status quo bias.
11Precautionary savings eﬀects arise when u000 > 0, a common assumption in applied economic
models.
19ployment at the ﬁrm and underweight employees that are likely to separate relatively
quickly. Future work should extend our theoretical framework by incorporating many
of these additional considerations.
Future work should also explore the empirical implications of our model. The model
makes quantitative predictions about the timing of savings rate changes. Employees
who change their savings rate soon after they are hired should select larger changes
than employees who change their savings rate long after they are hired. This is because
employees who are willing to wait a long time for a low cost opportunity to opt out
of the default are likely to have little to gain from doing so. The model also predicts
that average savings rates will not necessarily increase monotonically with the default
saving rate. As the default savings rate rises, procrastination eﬀects can strengthen,
leading more agents to delay selecting an even higher savings rate. Such perverse eﬀects
have already been observed in the data (Madrian and Shea 2001, Choi et al. 2003b).
Finally, the model suggests one important generalization that we are currently
exploring (Choi et al. 2002b). If it is occasionally optimal to select “bad” defaults –
i.e., defaults that are not close to one’s optimum saving rate – then it may be optimal
to pick defaults that are so “bad” that all consumers feel compelled to immediately opt
out of them. Such a setup is equivalent in practice to something that we call “active
decision,” a regime that forces new employees to pick their own savings rate early in
their tenure at the company without the beneﬁto faf a l l - b a c kd e f a u l t . I naw o r l d
with signiﬁcant procrastination, such active decision regimes are sometimes the best
20“defaults” of all.
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Figure 1: Expected total losses as a function of flow cost per period
β = 2/3 
β = 1 
L = 1-µ  L = 1/β - µ Table 1.  Characteristics of Employees and Their 401(k) Plans
Health Company Office Company Food Company  Financial Company
Employer Match $0.50/$1 to 6% $0.67/$1 to 6% None None
Contribution rate range 0% to 15% 0% to 16% 0% to 15% 0% to 15%
Company DB plan No Yes Yes No
401(k) participation rate 61.9% 74.2% 32.8% 63.4%
Avg. 401(k) contribution rate 4.3% 4.5% 2.0% 6.0%
Median salary $31,034 $27,629 $25,355 $41,109
Median age 37.9 years 36.7 years 38.5 years 28.9 years
Median tenure 4.8 years 5.4 years 5.6 years 2.0 years
Fraction female 77.8% 30.1% 54.0% 50.0%
Year 1997 1998 1998 1998
Source:  Company summary plan descriptions and calculations of the authors.  The sample in column 1 is all
employees with 1+ year of tenure.  The sample in column 2 is all employees with 2+ years of tenure.  The sample in
columns 3 and 4 is all employees.Table 2.  Savings Rate Distributions
This table reports distributions of savings rates.  f1(s
*) is the savings rate distribution of eligible employees at
December 31, 1997 whose tenure is between 3 and 5 years.  f2(s
*) is the savings rate distribution of eligible
employees at December 31, 1997 whose tenure is between 5 and 7 years.  f3(s
*) is the distribution of optimal savings
rates based on predicted values from an ordered logit regression of savings rate on age, gender, pay, and tenure.
Predicted values are calculated using 30 years of tenure instead of actual tenure.















0% 0.35 0.26 0.20 0.32 0.23 0.12 0.72 0.59 0.51 0.22 0.19 0.19
1% 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01
2% 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02
3% 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02
4% 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
5% 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.07
6% 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.24 0.31 0.36 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.04
7% 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03
8% 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.04
9% 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02
10% 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.13
11% 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02
12% 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03
13% 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
14% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.06
15% 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.20 0.20 0.30
1 6 % N AN AN A0 . 0 4 0 . 0 5 0 . 1 1N AN AN AN AN AN A
Mean 4.29% 5.00% 6.40% 4.02% 4.65% 6.43% 1.77% 2.40% 3.19% 7.50% 7.97% 8.82%Table 3.  Optimal Default Savings Rates
This table shows the optimal savings rate for four different firms.  Food Company and Financial Company have no
employer match in their plans.  f1(s
*) is the savings rate distribution of eligible employees at December 31, 1997
whose tenure is between 3 and 5 years.  f2(s
*) is the savings rate distribution of eligible employees at December 31,
1997 whose tenure is between 5 and 7 years.  f3(s
*) is the distribution of optimal savings rates based on predicted
values from an ordered logit regression of savings rate on age, gender, pay, and tenure.  Predicted values are
calculated using 30 years of tenure instead of actual tenure.














10 4% 5% 6% 4% 5% 6% 2% 2% 3% 7% 8% 9%
100 2% 2% 14% 2% 2% 5% 1% 1% 2% 2% 14% 14%
1000 0% 0% 15% 6% 6% 6% 0% 0% 0% 15% 15% 15%
Mean 4.29% 5.00% 6.40% 4.02% 4.65% 6.43% 1.77% 2.40% 3.19% 7.50% 7.97% 8.82%
Mode 0.00% 6.00% 6.00% 0.00% 6.00% 6.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 15.00% 15.00%